Christina is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. She studies constitutional theory and development, American and comparative constitutionalism, and the history of political thought. She is currently writing a book manuscript on the horizontal application of rights to non-state actors in comparative context. She has taught at Clemson University and received her doctorate in Government from the University of Texas at Austin.


Book manuscript

Christina’s book manuscript, Horizontal Rights: Constitutionalism and the Transformation of the Private Sphere, studies shifting understandings of public and private in comparative constitutionalism, specifically in the United States, Germany, India, South Africa, and the European Union. Jurists have traditionally understood the constitution as a separate kind of law that obligates only the state. However, courts increasingly understand constitutions as creating obligations for private entities such as private individuals, businesses, schools, and hospitals. For example, the South African Constitutional Court decided in 2017 that landlords have a constitutional duty to ensure their tenants live in conditions consonant with human dignity. Similar questions arise even in the United States, which historically has resisted the idea that constitutional rights bind private individuals. Recently, the Supreme Court found itself asking whether a Christian baker must bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. The practice of applying rights “horizontally” to private actors raises a range of questions from the theoretical to the practical and from the jurisprudential to the political.

Christina draws on constitutional debates, court cases, and political histories to argue that this development of horizontal effect reflects a republican intervention (as in, classical republican political theory) in constitutionalism, so altering the politics surrounding rights accordingly. While the conventional liberal narrative emphasizes the rights of individuals, horizontal effect builds a catalogue of individual duties as well, corresponding to the commitments and aspirations of a given constitutional order. In addition to examining constitutional histories, therefore, this research draws on classical and contemporary republican political theory.

This project is the first sustained effort to understand the practice of horizontal effect in terms of political theory, and only the second comparative monograph in political science on the subject. In accounting for the practical power of constitutional politics to shape the rights and duties of private entities, this research contributes to our knowledge of how governments act on conceptions of public and private in an increasingly pluralistic world.



Horizontal Rights: A Republican Vein in Liberal Constitutionalism. Polity, Volume 52, Issue 3, July 2020, Pages 401-429, DOI: 10.1086/709494. View article online.

Abstract: While liberal constitutional theory typically understands constitutions as establishing vertical arrangements in which governments protect individual rights, some courts have introduced doctrines of horizontal effect, holding private bodies responsible for the rights of others, as well. This article argues that we can understand such horizontal rights as a republican vein in the tradition of liberal constitutionalism. While the conventional liberal narrative emphasizes the rights of individuals, horizontal effect builds a catalogue of individual duties as well, corresponding to the commitments and aspirations of a given constitutional order. This article draws on classical and contemporary republican political theory, as well as cases from Germany, India, and South Africa, to demonstrate how the structure of and arguments for horizontal rights reflect proclivities and track commitments associated with republicanism. Though the fact of a republican streak in these rights need not make them antithetical to existing understandings of constitutionalism, it does admit the distinctive potential of horizontal rights to alter elements of the conventional narratives, about the nature, purpose, and limits of constitutionalism.


“Neither Precisely National Nor Precisely Federal”: Governmental and Administrative Authority in Tocqueville’s Democracy in AmericaPublius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 48, Issue 4, 1 September 2018, Pages 586–606, DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjy030.  View article online.

Abstract:  Tocqueville’s insights on local politics in Democracy in America have led some scholars to ask where he fits into longstanding debates about the balance of power between the national government and state governments in American constitutionalism. Although Tocqueville’s observations speak to these questions, he also transcends them by developing the concepts of governmental and administrative (de)centralization. In differentiating governmental and administrative capacities, Tocqueville offers language by which to understand and evaluate the federal system in terms of the nature of the authority each level of government exercises, rather than simply by the objects of national, state, and municipal powers. The purpose of this article is to clarify Tocqueville’s understanding of governmental and administrative (de)centralization and thereby contribute to a better understanding of political authority in the American federal system.


The Politics of Public and Private: Equality in India and the United States. In progress.

Abstract: American jurists typically understand the Constitution as creating a vertical arrangement in which state actors are responsible for protecting individual rights. Some courts in contrast, including the Indian Supreme Court, have begun to apply rights “horizontally,” holding private entities responsible for protecting and promoting rights as well. While these vertical and horizontal models are not by themselves determinate of case outcomes, their adoption in the United States and India, respectively, initiated a kind of path dependence, setting the terms of debate in each context to the present. In comparing these countries on the issue of equality, this article demonstrates how these different conceptions of the relationship between public and private spaces affect political-constitutional trajectories, defining presuppositions and framing the very questions that the courts must answer. This article thus moves horizontal effect beyond the purely doctrinal considerations of legal inquiry to show the political consequences of this constitutional phenomenon.


Rights in the Private Sphere: Horizontality in Constitutional Design. In progress. Coauthor: Maureen Stobb.


Considering the Possibility (and Desirability) of Liberal Virtues. In progress.


Download Christina’s CV.


Christina has designed and taught different undergraduate courses in political science focusing on constitutionalism and political theory. She views her concentration on constitutional rights as offering an important opportunity to educate students about their own rights and duties in a constitutional democracy. Christina was chosen to receive the University of Texas Liberal Arts Council’s Excellence in Teaching Award for the 2017-2018 academic year. Read her interview with the American Political Science Association about teaching and her contribution to APSA’s RAISE the Vote Campaign.


Constitutional Principles. Fall 2017. University of Texas at Austin. Syllabus.

Course Description:

In Federalist 1 Alexander Hamilton describes the project of the American framers to establish a constitution through “reflection and choice” rather than “accident and force.” Ultimately the 1787 Constitution was a product of extensive compromise, as different philosophical and political commitments informed the kinds of choices that different camps would pursue for the young country.

In this class we study the political philosophical traditions that shaped the constitutional debates and eventually the American constitutional order. In particular, we look at the republican tradition as represented by Aristotle, and the liberal tradition as represented by John Locke. After gaining some familiarity with these thinkers, we can begin to understand the commitments and preoccupations of the American Federalists and Anti-Federalists when we read the ratification debates. Finally, in studying Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations of the Early Republic, we see that these philosophical traditions and corresponding constitutional choices have consequences beyond the Constitution’s text. Even today these traditions continue to animate and define life in the American polity.

That the Constitution was the result of compromise is evident throughout the class. Most strikingly, America’s original sin of slavery poses vital challenges to many of the ideals and commitments we encounter in studying the Constitution’s foundations. Moreover, even those values that do seem to coexist productively sometimes collide–equality vs. liberty, security vs. local autonomy, democracy vs. individual rights. The framers sought to create a Constitution from reflection and choice. With the diversity of commitments and ideas informing the American constitutional order, however, perhaps the best we can hope for is a Constitution of constant striving, but never fully realized.


An Introduction to Rights: Theory, Practice, and Debates. Spring 2017. University of Texas at Austin. Syllabus.

Course Description:

It’s a free country! It’s my right! How many times have you heard these expressions? How many times have you used them? From these playground taunts to more serious appeals in public fora, the language of rights pervades American discourse today. This may be a virtue if this rights-consciousness results in a more just society. But it may be counterproductive as well. People may resort to “rights talk” at the expense of reasoned argument, preventing understanding or dialogue with others who seem to disagree. Moreover, emphasizing rights may distract from thinking about our duties as citizens or even as human beings.

If we are going to discuss and debate rights as much as we do, we should know something about them. Arguably, we should know something about their history, their status in law, and the important questions concerning rights that are up for debate even today. This course is an introduction to each of these aspects of the concept of rights, offering a broad introduction so that students walk away more informed on the subject of rights in general.

In the first section of the class, we read many of the essential texts from the history of rights theory. The second section covers in broad strokes the history of rights in constitutional law. Though we focus on United States constitutional law, I take opportunities throughout to draw comparisons with other countries. Lastly, we take up a variety of questions about rights that remain open for debate. Where do we think rights come from? How do we find rights in law? Can rights ever be limited or taken away? Are there limits to what the concept of rights can accomplish? After the first two sections of the course, students are prepared to weigh in on these big questions, and even offer some answers.